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The purpose of this research is to test an economic model of insti-
tutions of higher learning (IHLs). The Prestige Maximization Model 
suggests that college and university behavior, as measured by expenditure 
per student, will be affected by the sources of revenue available to an 
institution. The results of analysis of cross-sectional samples of IHL 
financial and enrollment data support the model's implication that IHLs 
placing greater reliance on non-students for revenue have greater 
expenditures per student. 
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Education is one of the largest industries in the United States. 
In the 1979-80 academic year, $166 billion worth of resources were 
consumed in the pursuit of education at all levels. 1979 fall enroll-
ment at institutions of higher education was 11.6 million. This, along 
with the substantial explicit expenditure ($59.1 billion or about 3% of 
1979 GNP), represents a significant allocation of productive resources 
to the higher education industry. 
Not only is education an important industry from the standpoint of 
size, it is also one of the few activities which provides its consumers 
with investment benefits in the form of human capital appreciation. 
Education increases productivity and earning power. Much of the dis-
parity between incomes of poor and rich nations is due to differences 
in investment in human capital. Studies relating the growth of real 
GNP to growth in the United States capital stock and labor force have 
uncovered a "growth gap", economic growth in excess of that expected 
from the growth in the quantity of resources and technology along (33). 
The answer lies in the increased quality of labor force due to invest-
ment in human capital via education and work training (34). 
It is this accumulation of human capital that explains the so 
called "Leontif Paradox" (24). The United States, traditionally 
classified as capital intensive relative to its foreign trading partners, 
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was found to be exporting products that were labor intensive in produc-
tion. This contradicted the accepted trade theory that predicts a 
nation will tend to specialize in and export products that use 
intensively its abundant factor, presumed to be capital. Only after 
U.S. labor inputs were adjusted for their greater skill and training 
due to education was the riddle solved. The United States was indeed 
"exporting" its abundant factor, highly educated and skilled labor 
(25, 35). 
State, local and federal governments are deeply involved in the 
provision of education in the United States. State and local government 
agencies provide primary, secondary and higher education and the federal 
government disperses billions of taxpayers dollars annually directly to 
students in the form of loans and grants and appropriations to insti-
tutions and programs at all levels. Although heated debate over the 
appropriate level of and means of providing support exists, there is 
an economic rationale behind this involvement in education. 
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First, there is evidence that the market may fail in the provision 
of a good that provides "spillover benefits" in production or consumption. 
The private market will underallocate resources to the production of 
educational services as individual consumers (parents and their 
children) fail to internalize the external benefits generated in the 
schooling process as they make their decision as to how much education 
to consume. Most economists agree that primary education does, indeed, 
create these external effects, and that government support of 
education at the primary level is justified as a means of increasing 
allocative efficiency. 
A second agrument in favor of government support of education is 
based on equity grounds. Aid can be provided to the poor in a variety 
of ways. Cash transfers, food subsidies, low cost housing, medicaid 
and many other programs are designed to help the less well-to-do. 
Although these programs were created to redistribute income to the poor 
and reduce the burdens associated with low incomes, they are not very 
effective in dealing with the causes of low incomes. One cause of 
poverty in the United States is unequal distribution of the quantity 
and quality of productive resources. Human capital, in the form of 
education and job training, is probably one of the most unequally 
distributed resources. Thus, aid to education could provide a type of 
dynamic income redistribution. Helping the less fortunate obtain 
education that they could otherwise not afford can provide these 
families with the resources necessary to help themselves. Investment 
in human capital has great potential for making long-run gains in the 
war on poverty. Although some economists argue that many current 
educational aid programs are perverse in their redistribution effects 
(17), most agree that government support of education for the poor is 
justified and that policies could be changed to make the redistribu-
tional effects most equitable. 
As important as this industry may be in promoting economic growth 
and potentially reducing poverty, education has infrequently been the 
subject of the allocative and cost efficiency studies so prevalent in 
the main body of economic research. Only recently has the institution 
of higher education been the subject of efficiency questions such as 
"How much should we spend to support colleges and universities?" 
Economists have done little to address the issue of efficiency in the 
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production of human capital. Billions are being spent to produce human 
capital. Are we getting the most "output" possible given these large 
amounts of "inputs"? 
A factor that may be responsible for the relative lack of research 
in this area is the problem of defining and measuring the inputs and 
outputs of the education process. All production efficiency studies 
require measures of outputs and inputs. We do not even know what all 
the outputs of the educational process are, let alone how to measure 
them. The benefits from attending college are nebulous and hard to 
quantify. Students receive both consumption and investment benefits and 
third parties probably receive spillovers. Human capital production is 
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a unique type of asset appreciation. Students with x units of productive 
capacity enter schools as freshmen and leave four years later as college 
graduates with x + x' units of productive capacity, where x' is the 
value added during the education process. The freshman students' 
abilities and other characteristics must be known if the contribution 
made by education, alone, is to be estimated. 
The purpose of this study is to develop a microeconomic model of 
institutions of higher learning (IHLs) and to test hypotheses about 
the behavior of these institutions with data from a cross section of 
private and public colleges and universities. The model stresses that 
the differences in the sources of IHL revenue and type of control 
(private or public) are determinants of differences in the constraints 
faced by college and university administrators. The model implies 
that these varying constraints placed upon the administrators of public 
(state-supported) and private institutions will be reflected in 
differences in the behavior of IHLs. It is hypothesized that these 
constraint dissimilarities will be reflected in observable differences 
in behavior measured in terms of expenditures per student. 
The model, and the methodology used to test its implications, will 
be developed and explained in Chapters III and IV, following a review 
of previous research on education cost functions and models of private 
and public non-profit firm behavior. Chapter V contains the empirical 
results and tests of the models implications. A summary and conclusions 
of the research are found in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The purpose of this study is to develop and test a model os IHL 
behavior which predicts that colleges and universities will exhibit 
different behavior, as indicated by expenditures per student, due to 
differences in sources of revenue and type of control. The model 
suggests that these behavioral differences will show up in IHL average 
cost (expenditure per student) functions. The first part of this 
literature review focuses on previous estimates of college and university 
average cost functions. 
A model attempting to explain IHL behavior will, of course, be 
different from the models of profit seeking, privately owned firms. 
Colleges and universities are non-profit organizations, many of which 
are state owned and supported. The second part of the literature 
review discusses a number of models of non-prof it and public firm 
behavior. A model of a bureaucracy developed by Niskanen (26) is 
explained, followed by studies of the demand for private and public 
higher education. An empirical study comparing a private with a 
publicly owned airline (10), and three models of hospital behavior are 
then reviewed (9, 20, 27). Clarkson compares the performance of 
proprietary and non-profit hospitals and Lee develops a model which 
emphasizes the non-prof it status of many hospitals as an explanation 
of rapidly rising health care costs. 
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The model developed and tested in this study is based on Newhouse's 
(27) model of hospital behavior which suggests that the prestige of a 
hospital is an important determinant of the utility of the administrators 
of the institution. As will be discussed later, this type of model may 
well explain the behavior of the administrators of IHLs. Newhouse's 
model is reviewed last, following the review of cost function research 
and the other non-market firm behavior models. 
Maynard (26) uses the theory of long-run average cost to explain 
why IHLs should have U shaped average cost functions much like those 
expected for manufacturing firms. Economies of size cause the per-
student instructional cost to fall over a range of increased size. 
Ultimately, the average cost curve will flatten out, and may even rise 
for large institutions as diseconomies of size set in. 
Economies of size for IHLs are caused predominantly by a reduction 
in the faculty and administrative staff per student requirement as an 
individual institution approaches what Maynard calls the threshold staff 
size. A college or university is constrained to a minimum instruction 
and administrative staff size, regardless of the number of students. 
A small college with five academic departments may need a minimum staff 
of 30 in order to provide basic course offerings and administration. 
If the school is committed to. a maximum student-staff ratio of 20, the 
staffing cost per student would fall as enrollment reached the 
threshold level of 600. At a greater enrollment than this, the school 
can add instructors as needed to maintain any desired student-faculty 
ratio and the average costs should flatten out. Since college instruc-
tion is very labor-intensive, Maynard argues that there is a tendency 
for costs per student to fall up to some threshold enrollment level as 
a major part of the total costs per student are due to these faculty 
and staff requirements. 
Maynard tests his theory by estimating long-run average cost curves 
which relate per student costs to the size of the institution as 
measured by enrollment. Maynard's reference to long-run costs is 
somewhat confusing as many of the reasons he offers in support of 
declining costs apply to short-run cost analysis. The notion of a 
threshold size of enrollment implies some fixed inputs, such as a 
minimum size physical plant, administrative staff, and faculty. Maynard 
assumes that institutions are in long-run equilibrium so that their 
short-run average cost functions trace out the long-run cost function 
which he is describing. Long-run cost savings can be realized as 
specialization and division of administration and faculty becomes 
feasible with increased size, but Maynard does not stress these sources 
of long-run average cost reductions. 
Maynard used cross sectional data from state supported four-year 
colleges in 13 different states for his cost estimates. He assumes that 
the quality of the educational services will not vary between state 
supported colleges in a given state as state governing boards are 
pressured to appropriate funds in an equitable manner. Thus, the 
question of inter-school quality differences was addressed, although 
it is unlikely that it was resolved. No explanatory variables other 
than the number of students were included in his model and functions 
were estimated for each of the 13 different states. 
A parabolic function (y' = a + bx + cx2) was estimated using 
multiple regression analysis. y' is predicted per student cost and 
x is the school size as measured by number of full time equivalent 
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students. His results support the economies of size hypothesis as all of 
his estimated cost functions had negative and significant b coefficients. 
The general average cost function derived from the 13 separate estimates 
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was y' = 2 - .244x + .00002275 x Each of the 13 separate functions 
differed significantly only in the intercept term, a, which measures 
the height of the cost function when x, enrollment, is equal to zero. 
This average cost function reaches its lowest point at an enrollment 
level of 5,363 and slowly rises as enrollment increases beyond that level. 
Maynard's extrapolation of his results to explain the financial 
troubles of many private colleges is of particular interest for this 
study. Although he did not estimate cost functions for private schools, 
he argues that they suffer from small size which precludes their attain-
ment of economies and low average costs. 
An early study by Russell and Reeves (32) of higher education 
costs supports Maynard's findings of size economies. In this study, 
44 institutions were divided into 
For each of these quality groups, 
thlee homogeneous "excellence" groups. 
fr1ehand functions were drawn through 
the points relating enrollment and educational expenditure (cost) per 
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student. Although schools were much smaller at the time the study was 
done, the lines of best fit did confirm that size economies were 
present. 
The results of another study of private, church related liberal 
arts colleges done by Russell and Reeves (31) also indicated the 
existence of size economies in those schools. Maynard (26) used the 
data from this study to compute rank order coefficients of correlation 
for 17 accredited schools. The schools were ranked by size, with the 
largest school receiving a rank of one, and by expenditure per student, 
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with the institution having the lowest expenditure per student getting 
a rank of one. A positive correlation coefficient would indicate falling 
costs per student associated with increased size. After dividing the 
sample into two subgroups based on regional differences, Maynard 
determined that these rank order coefficients were significant and 
positive. 
In a recent book, Bowen (6) looked at the relationship between 
institutional affluence, as measured by educational cost (or expenditure) 
per student, and the internal allocation of expenditures among the major 
functions of teaching, student services, scholarships and fellowships, 
academic support (expenditures for the support services that are an 
integral part of the institution's primary missions of instruction, 
research, or public service including expenditures for libraries, 
museums, galleries, audio-visual services, academic data-processing 
and administration, and personnel, course and curriculum development), 
institutional support (expenditures for the day-to-day operational 
support of the institution including general administrative services, 
executive direction and planning, legal and fiscal operations, and 
community relations), and plant maintenance and operation. No striking 
relationships between institutional affluence and expenditure patterns 
were found. As schools become more affluent (greater expenditures per 
student) they tend to allocate additional expenditures more or less 
equally toward all functions. Only one consistent difference between 
the expenditure patterns of public and private institutions was found. 
Private schools allocated a greater portion of their budgets to 
scholarships and fellowships than did public institutions. This is not 
surprising since private institutions are at a competitive disadvantage 
as a result of less government support and therefore must rely more on 
student tuition and fees to cover costs. 
Bowen also compared educational cost per student for different 
size classes of institutions in search of evidence of economies of size. 
The 268 institutions in his sample were partitioned into fifths by size 
(as measured by enrollments), and the educational cost per student was 
calculated for each of the five size groups. The data provide evidence 
that size economies do exist, but they are slight. The smallest fifth 
of the 268 IHLs had an average cost of $3,163. Average costs fell to a 
low of $2,475 for the next to the largest quintile of institutions, 
and increased to $2,835 for the largest fifth (6). 
After studying the internal allocations for institutions of 
different size classifications, a tentative explanation for the lack 
fo strong evidence of economies of size was offered. Bowen found per 
student cost savings with larger institutional size for institutional 
support (administration), student services, and plant operation and 
maintenance but these savings seemed to be off set by the devotion of 
additional resources saved to instruction. Thus, economies of size 
did not show up as reductions in overall unit cost. Bowen argues that 
cost savings that accompany increased size serve as new revenues for 
higher salaries, new equipment, and the development of new programs. 
Niskanen (28) developed a model of non-market decision making that 
attempts to explain the behavior of bureaucracies. His model can also 
be applied to non-profit firms that receive all or part of their 
revenues from sources other than the consumers of the firms output. 
The performances of non-profit decisionmakers' and government bureau-
crats' are not evaluated on the basis of the profitability of their 
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enterprises. Niskanen assumes instead that the objective function of 
these administrators contains objectives other than profits, and that 
measures of these objectives are likely to increase monotonically with 
increases in the total budget of the enterprise. He argues that budget 
maximization is an adequate proxy for their objective function. 
Niskanen's model assumes that bureaus possess two critical 
characteristics: 
1. Bureaucrats attempt to maximize the total budget of their 
bureau, for given demand and cost conditions. The bureaucracy 
is constrained in that its budget must be greater than or 
equal to the minimum total cost of producing the output. 
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2. Bureaus exchange a specific output for a specific budget. 
Niskanen concludes that the objectives of bureaucrats and the "all 
or nothing" conditions surrounding the "sale" of the bureaucracy's 
output will lead to greater growth than the bureaucracy would experience 
as a competitive firm. This theory, to the extent that it applies to 
state-supported higher education, may provide an explanation of the 
rapid increase in the size of public IHLs. In fact, the results of an 
empirical study by Hight (18) indicate that growth in public IHLs has 
been at the expense of private higher education, as Niskanen's model 
implies. 
In his study, Hight developed a model to explain the falling ratio 
of private to public enrollments since 1947. His theory suggests that 
changes in income and relative tuition charges are the major factors 
determining the relative decline in private school enrollments. 
Institutions of higher learning are assumed to have some control over 
demand conditions by altering admissions requirements and tuition 
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charges. Changes in the private to public enrollment ratio can have two 
causes. First, given equal price elasticities of demand, unequal changes 
in tuition at private and public colleges and universities will lead to 
differential changes in enrollment. Since private tuition has risen by 
a greater amount (in absolute and relative terms) compared to state-
supported institutions, private school enrollments have fallen relative 
to enrollments at public institutions. 
Another possible source of the observed enrollment shift are 
differing price or income elasticities between the two types of 
institutions. If the public sector has a greater income elasticity, 
increases in income and/or equal increases in tuitions would cause the 
ratio of private to public enrollment to fall over time. Hight argues 
that there are no indications that this is the case. Time series data 
from various years between 1927 and 1972 were used to estimate these 
price and income elasticities for the two types of institutions. The 
price elasticities were insignificant in both cases while the income 
elasticity of demand for private higher education was significant and 
greater than the income elasticity for public institutions. This 
indicates that income increases by themselves tend to raise the private 
to public enrollment ratio. Hight concludes that the increase in 
private tuition relative to that of public institutions has swamped 
the income effect that favors private institutions. 
Other studies of the demand for higher education fail to support 
Hight's findings. Hopkins (19) used cross sectional data from the 
1963-64 academic year to estimate the enrollment demand for private 
and public IHLs. The ratio of in-state public (or private) enrollment 
to the number of eligible residents within a given state was used as 
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the dependent variable in an enrollment demand equation which included 
private and public tuition levels, a measure of private school proximity, 
family personal income, and family education as measured by the percen-
tage of families in a state with at least one college graduate head-
of-household. Public college tuition, close proximity to private 
institutions, and family income had a significant negative influence 
on the public IHL enrollment ratio while public IHL demand was positively 
related to family college education. The demand for private IHL services 
was positively related to family income. Hopkins determined that the 
price elasticities of demand were quite different between the two types 
of institutions. The elasticities of private and public enrollment 
demand were -.736 and -.29 respectively with the demand at public 
institutions being less elastic. 
Campbell and Siegel (7) estimated the price and income elasticities 
of demand for higher education with time series data from the 1914 to 
1964 period. They used the ratio of undergraduate enrollment to the 
number of 18 to 20 year olds with high school diplomas that are not in 
the armed forces as a measure of the demand for higher education. 
Aggregate data were used to estimate the function Rt = a + blnYt + 
clnPt where Rt is the enrollment ratio in year t, and Yt and Pt are 
real disposable income per household and average real tuition in period 
t. b and c provide estimates of the income and price elasticities of 
demand for higher education. The estimate of the income elasticity 
was 1.20. The price elasticity was estimated to be -.44. Both of the 
elasticity estimates were significantly different from zero. 
Significant income and price elasticities of demand for higher 
education were also estimated by Lehr and Newton (21) using time series 
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data from Oregon institutions of higher learning. Yearly data from the 
period 1960 to 1974 on fall enrollment in institutions of higher 
education, average real tuition (weighted by institutional enrollments), 
mean real per capita personal income in Oregon, the annual unemployment 
rate in Oregon, the number of 18-24 year olds in the Armed Forces, and 
the total number of Oregon high school graduates were used to estimate 
a log-linear demand function relating enrollment to tuition, income, 
unemployment and the number of potential students. Estimates of the 
income and price elasticities of demand were 1.882 and -.6586 
respectively. These are slightly larger in absolute value than the 
elasticities estimated by Campbell and Siegel. Lehr and Newton 
attribute this to their use of freshman enrollments as the dependent 
demand variable. They argue that total enrollment is less volatile 
in the face of changing costs and income as sophomores, juniors, and 
seniors are committed to continue school after the initial decision 
to attend college. 
The emphasis of this study is on the differences in the constraints 
faced by decision makers in private and public IHLs and the effect 
these constraint differences have on educational costs per student. 
Economists have been interested in the effect that the type of organi-
zation and control have on other production activities. Some of the 
important studies in this area are reviewed below. 
Davie.s (12) did an interesting study of two Australian airlines. 
He was fortunate in that the Australian airline industry provided a 
good "controlled experiment" on the effect of different types of 
ownership. The Australian airline industry is composed of two almost 
identical airline companies. Both have similar aircraft, are of equal 
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size, and service the same routes, the major difference being that one 
is privately owned and operated, and the other publicly owned. Even 
though both are regulated and precluded from the free pursuit of 
profits, Davies argues that the ability of the owners of the private 
firm to sell their ownership rights provides them with an incentive to 
engage in a certain amount of monitoring of the airlines activities that 
the onwers of the public firm would not find worthwhile. Taxpayers, 
who are unable to sell their ownership rights in public firms, have 
little interest in efficient and profitable operation, and would not be 
expected to expend as many resources to monitor the public airline. 
This provides the managers of the public airline with more leeway to 
pursue objectives that may be contrary to efficient operation. The 
public airline is expected to suffer from X-ineff iciency to a greater 
degree than the private airline. 
Output to input ratios for the two airlines were compared by 
Davies. The existence of lower output-intput ratios would indicate 
greater per unit costs and the presence of X-inefficiency. Davies 
compared (1) tons of freight and mail carried per employee, (2) the 
number of paying passengers per employee, and (3) revenue earned per 
employee for the two airlines, and four that the private airline had 
higher values for all three of these measures of productivity. He 
concludes that the difference in ownership constraints faced by the 
two airlines does lead to less efficient operation in the public firm. 
A number of hospital studies have supported the hypothesis that 
behavior or performance will differ with different types of institu-
tional ownership or objectives (9, 20, 27). Clarkson (9) derives and 
tests the implications of a model of hospital behavior that emphasizes 
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the importance of differences in property rights. Profit seeking 
(proprietary) hospitals' owners and trustees have property rights in the 
value of the firm that are transferable by sale. Owners of proprietary 
hospitals benefit directly from efficient hospital operation in the form 
of increased value in the property rights they possess. Claims to the 
ownership of non-prof it hospitals are not transferable by sale, and 
managers do not have exclusive claims on any prof its derived from 
efficient use of resources. For these reasons, Clarkson expects the 
owners of proprietary hospitals to appoint stricter managers and to 
spend more resources on the monitoring of management to ensure that 
managers will have greater incentives to act in the best interest of 
the owners. Non-profit hospital managers will be better able to pursue 
their own interests by channeling hospital resources to their personal 
use and "shirking" on the job, both at the expense of the net wealth 
of the owners of the hospital. 
Clarkson does not calculate any productivity measures to compare 
the efficiency of the two types of hospitals. Instead, information 
concerning management effort and types of external controls is gathered 
and compared. Some important differences that are expected are: 
1. External control efforts, such as rules set down by conunissions 
or trustees, will be more extensive and explicit for non-profit 
hospitals than for proprietary hospitals. 
2. Non-profit hospitals will show more variability of input mixes 
as their managers have less incentive to move toward the most 
efficient production technique. 
Clarkson's empirical findings support these assertions. A greater 
percentage of non-prof it hospitals than of proprietary hospitals have 
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formal budgets approved by an external governing board, use the American 
Hospital Association chart of accounts, have written sets of staff 
regulations, and have regularly scheduled staff meetings. Non-profit 
hospitals also have greater variances of input combinations. 
Evidence that proprietary hospitals' managers are more concerned 
with market conditions and efficiency is also provided. Non-profit 
managers use market information less of ten than do the for-prof it 
hospital managers, and for-profit hospitals are less likely to give 
automatic pay increases. Clarkson's major contention that the difference 
in property rights will affect managers efforts to pursue owner's 
interests seems to be supported by his findings. 
Another model which suggests that non-profit hospitals are less 
efficient in resource use than their private counterparts is called 
the Conspicuous Production Model and was developed by Lee (20). This 
model incorporates prestige or status as an important component of 
hospital decision makers' utility functions. Non-profit hospitals 
compete for status, not profits, and Lee argues that this is the major 
cause of the spiraling costs in health care. 
The administrators of non-profit hospitals seek to close the gap 
between the status they desire the hopsital to have and the hospital's 
actual status. The actual level of a hospital's status is determined 
by the quality and quantity of inputs used in producing medical care. 
A hospital's desired status is predominantly determined by the perceived 
status of other hospitals, which depends, in turn, upon the level of 
inputs they use. 
Lee's model assumes that hospitals will strive to attain inputs 
to close this status gap, given a revenue constraint. The problem is 
to minimize (I' - Ia), subject to revenues being greater than or equal 
to the costs of the inputs consumed. I' is the desired level of inputs 
for the hospital and is a function of the levels of inputs of other 
hospitals, and Ia is the actual level of inputs used by the hospital. 
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A hospital justifies additional expenditures on sophisticated 
equipment as an attempt to keep up with other hospitals. Hospitals 
depend heavily on doctors' referrals for their patients, and are 
therefore responsive to the medical staff's demands for complementary 
inputs. These inputs are viewed as implicity payments to physicians 
deemed necessary to maintain a flow of patients. Quality (and status) 
can be pursued with little regard for costs because the actual consumers 
do not directly feel the impact of higher prices in the short-run and 
they have allowed the medical care profession to make medical care 
decisions for them. In addition, the widespread practice of average 
cost pricing of health care weakens the association between increased 
expenditures on new inputs and increased costs for the services those 
inputs provide. 
Lee's model indicates that hospital costs are determined not only 
by the level of the hospital's output, but also by the level of inputs 
used by at.her hospitals. The model implies frequent use of inputs 
superior to those necessary to provide adequate health care services. 
For example, highly trained technicians may be employed for tasks not 
requiring a high level of expertise. Overduplication of expensive and 
sophisticated equipment that is non-essential for most aspects of health 
care production is expected. 
Some evidence is presented by Lee which supports these assertions. 
The rapid increases in per patient hospital costs, rapid growth of 
corporate hospital chains, and evidence of overduplication of extremely 
specialized heart surgery equipment support the Conspicuous Production 
Model of non-profit hospital behavior. 
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Institutions of higher learning have some things in common with 
hospitals. The non-profit status, and multiproduct nature of these 
institutions are similar. The model used in this study draws most 
heavily from an economic model of individual hospital behavior developed 
by Newhouse (27). 
In Newhouse's model, the maximand, or objective function of 
hospital administrators has as an important component the quantity of 
hospital services provided. Large hospitals are viewed as prestigious 
by administrators, and this desire to be large produces an incentive 
to keep costs low to attract patients. Newhouse makes the argument that 
his model is also applicable to colleges and universities because third 
party payments, by insurance companies and government aid in the case 
of medical care, and private gifts and state and federal tax dollars 
in the case of education, are common payment practices in both industries. 
These payment schemes make the consumers of hospital and educational 
services much less responsive to cost-of-service increases. 
A second important component of the administrators' objective 
function is the quality (as indicated by per patient expenditure) of 
the health care provided. Administrators' performance can not be judged 
by the profitability of the medical care unit so the institution's 
prestige is the predominant concern. The two most important determinants 
of prestige are assumed by Newhouse to be the size of the hospital in 
terms of the number of patients and the quality of the services 
provided. 
Hospitals are constrained such that an increase in patient care or 
size with a given budget means per patient expenditures, or quality, 
will fall. Hospital administrators pick a combination of size and 
expenditures per patient (subject to the tradeoff between the two) that 
maximizes the utility of the administrators. As a hospital administra-
tion considers increasing the quality of its health care beyond the 
minimum necessary to obtain accreditation, the demand for the service 
increases also. Whether or not the amount of service units provided 
increases depends on the size of this increase in demand, brought about 
by a quality increase, relative to the increase in average costs of 
producing tae greater quality health care. For initial increases in 
costs and quality, demand increases may be large enough so that the 
institution can grow in terms of both quantity and quality. This type 
of growth unambiguously increases the hospital's prestige. However, a 
point will ultimately be reached where the added costs of maintaining 
a given level of quality require patient charges high enough to reduce 
size (in terms of the quantity of service demanded). The frontier 
illustrating this quality-quantity trade off is shown in Figure 1. This 
graph illustrates the ultimate constraint of a limited willingness on 
the part of health care consumers to pay for higher quality services. 
At some level of quality, the costs of increasing the quality of 
service choke off increases in demand and higher quality comes at 
the expense of reduced size. The combination of quality and the number 
of patient days of service that the hospital administrator would 
actually pick is determined by his preference map. One indifference 
curve from such a map is shown as Io, which depicts combinations of 









Source: Newhouse (27, p. 68). 
Figure 1. Newhouse' s Hypothetical Trade Off Between the 
Quality and Quantity of Service for a 
Non-Profit Hospital 
administrator's utility is maximized when the quality-quantity combina-
tion shown at point M is achieved. 
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An important implication of this model is that a bias exists 
against the production of lower quality (and cost) products because 
output quality is an important component of the administrator's utility 
function. Non-profit hospitals are not expected to produce all feasible 
qualitites of services. Low quality services do not add to administra-
tor's utility to the degree that high quality services do. Therefore, 
a utility maximizing administrator is expected to opt for a higher 
quality mix of hospital services. Profit seeking hospitals are expected 
to produce some lower quality services if these are profitable, whereas 
non-profit institutions would not do so. Newhouse provides evidence 
that indicates that this is the case. A smaller proportion of profit 
seeking hospitals are accredited and for profit nursing homes have a 
smaller proportion of registered nurses. The model also predicts 
duplication by hospitals of the sophisticated and expensive equipment 
necessary for high quality health care. Newhouse also provides 
evidence that non-prof it hospitals are generally more capital intensive 
than profit earning institutions (27). 
Newhouse points out that third party payment schemes (insurance 
or government reimbursement of medical expenses) increases the tendency 
for hospitals to pursue high quality. This results in rapid increases 
in hospital costs and insurance rates as hospital administrators have 
little fear of pricing the insured or subsidized medical care recipient 
out of the market. 
These empirical studies of non-market firm behavior and the 
theoretical work explaining decision maker's behavior in non-profit 
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and non-market environments should prove helpful in the study of higher 
education. An economic model of an IHL is developed in the next chapter 
and will be followed by tests of the models implications. 
CHAPTER III 
AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF INSTITUTIONS 
OF HIGHER LEARNING 
As indicated in the previous chapter, there are many similarities 
between hospitals and IHLs. Both are multiservice firms relying on a 
mixture of payments from customers (patients or students) and third 
parties to obtain operating revenue. Both of these industries enjoy a 
substantial amount of freedom from competitive pressures to hold costs 
down. In addition to the lack of the profit motive and the third party 
compensation schemes, certain aspects of the production of health care 
and educational services are also detrimental to incentives for cost 
efficiency. 
Such a high level of expertise is required to administer medical 
care that patients generally allow most decisions about the type and 
quality of treatment needed to be made by their physician. Little 
bargaining over the price or type of treatment necessary takes place 
as the patient assumes "the doctor knows best". Although the production 
of higher learning may not be as complicated and technical as medicine, 
so little is known by the potential customer about the education 
production process that educators also are given a relatively free hand 
to experiment with new curricula and teaching techniques. Very little 
input from parents or students is sought when decisions regarding 
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production techniques, which actively involve the student as an input, 
are being made. 
The economic model of IHLs developed here is similar to those for 
hospitals for the above reasons. In the model presented below, the 
administrators of an institution of higher learning are assumed to 
pursue status, or prestige, given the constraints of private and public 
gifts and subsidies and the student demand for educational services. 
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The administrators seek status because they are motivated to do so as a 
means of demonstrating success, and also because they have the 
opportunity to do so in the absence of any strong competitive pressures. 
The most important components of IHL status are assumed to be the 
size of the institution, the expenditure per student, and the quality 
of the IHL's students. Expenditure per student is not to be interpreted 
as an actual measure of the quality of the "output" of a IHL but, rather, 
as a measure of the level of the inputs used per studnet. Studies have 
shown tendencies for greater qualities and quantities of education 
inputs to be associated with greater educational outcomes, but the 
relationships are of ten weak. Reed and Miller (30) found a weak, but 
positive, relationship between input quality (as measured .by freshman 
aptitude scores) and graduate earnings. Weisbroad and Karpoff (36) 
found evidence that the earnings of graduates are positively related 
to their rank in their college's graduating class, as well as to a 
subjective measure of college quality (as measured by rankings given 
by company personnel officers). Bowles and Levin (5), in a critique 
of the Coleman Report, found a significant and positive influence of 
teacher verbal ability, teacher salaries, and instructional expendi-
ture per student on student achievement. Astin (3) found little 
relationship between measures of college environmental characteristics 
such as per student expenditures, library size and number of books 
per student, faculty-student ratios, and the proportion of faculty 
with terminal degrees, and outcomes as measured by GRE scores. The 
most important determinant of achievement (as indicated by GRE scores) 
in his study was the students' academic ability prior to attending 
college as measured by national merit scholarship qualifying exam 
scores. 
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In general, greater expenditure per student implies a greater 
quantity or quality of resources employed per student. An administrator 
of an IHL can increase the quality of the education services that are 
provided at his institution by either applying more and better resources 
to the instruction of students, or by employing the same quality and 
quantity of resources in a more efficient manner. Higher EPS could 
indicate greater effort and expense in the education process, or it 
could indicate inefficiency if the higher costs per student were not 
improving the institutions output. Measures of the quantity and 
quality of IHL output are needed before it can be determined if 
differences in EPS are indications of quality changes or changes in 
the efficiency of colleges and universities. 
The actual quality of the education institution's output is not 
the point of interest in this study. The purpose of this study is 
to explain differences that exist in IHL behavior as evidenced by the 
institution's expenditures per student. The objective is not to label 
a particular institution as being of higher quality than another on 
the basis of differences in expenditures per student. The administra-
tors of an IHL, however, are likely to assess the institution's commitment 
to "quality" education on the basis of the resources available for each 
student. As an example, an administrator may use the faculty-student 
ratio as an important measure of the quality of the institution's 
instruction because a higher faculty student ratio, ceteris paribus, 
would indicate more personalized instruction. A higher faculty-to-
student ratio will be associated with greater per-student labor costs. 
Other measures of resource consumption per student could be developed 
such as total staff (administration and faculty) per student or average 
class size (a smaller average class size indicating greater inputs 
per student), but expenditure per student is the most easily observed 
proxy for the "quality" of the educational experience and it will be 
used in this study as a quality variable in the IHL administrators 
objective function. 
A second major factor determining the prestige of an IHL is size. 
Education is much like medical care in the sense that it is viewed by 
many that are responsible for supplying it as a service which everyone 
has a "right" to obtain. Above all, a lack of income or wealth should 
not be a barrier to an education. The administrator of a college or 
university perceives his job as one of promoting a social purpose, 
that of making the educational experience available to all who are 
qualified, regardless of income. 
Baumol and Bowen (4) describe the basic characteristics of non-
profit organizations .and their emphasis on size. These institutions 
earn no monetary return on their invested capital and can not use 
profit as a measure of performance. Non-prof it institutions claim 
to fulfill some valuable social function but always seem to be in 
need of more funds, either to create new programs or to expand existing 
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ones. The administrators of non-profit institutions view themselves as 
suppliers of virtue, believing their services should be distributed 
as widely as possible. According to Baumol and Bowen, the administra-
tors of institutions of higher learning believe that the provision of 
educational services should not be inhibited by a lack of wealth or 
income. 
In addition to their altruistic concern for large quantities of 
educational output, there are reasons based on self-interest which 
suggest that the size of a non-profit institution is directly related 
to the utility of the institution's decision makers. In non-profit 
institutions, the administrators' salaries and promotional opportunities 
are determined by criteria other than profits. The size of the 
institution is one indicator of the administrator's work load and hence 
his appropriate compensation. In addition to any pecuniary rewards 
that are influenced by the size of an institution, an administrator's 
personal status may be enhanced by the visibility that accompanies the 
larger institution. 
Large institutions are generally more visible, well known and 
prestigious than small ones. There are other reasons, in addition to 
visibility, that may prompt IHLs to increase enrollments. Certainly 
in the case of state supported institutions, the availability of 
revenues is most of ten contingent upon increased "need" as demonstrated 
by a growing student population. For both private and public schools, 
increasing enrollments indicate success in providing for the educational 
demands of students. No institution can survive if its enrollment 
declines for an extended period of time. Different IHLs will, of 
course, place different emphasis on quality and quantity. Some schools 
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may prefer small size and a more personal atmosphere over large size and 
a less personal atmosphere. These differences in prestige functions will 
simply result in some schools seeking different quality and quantity 
combinations even if faced with similar constraints. 
The tradeoff between size and expenditures per student is assumed 
to be essentially the same as that explained by Newhouse (27) in his 
model of non-profit hospital behavior (see Figure 1). The derivation 
of this tradeoff for an IHL is illustrated in Figure 2. The institu-
tion's average cost, or expenditure per student (EPS), is shown as the 
horizontal line labeled EPSo. For simplicity, this level of per 
student expenditure implies a certain "quality" of instruction at 
the institution. If the IHL charged a tuition sufficient to cover 
all of these costs, the institution would have an enrollment of qo 
given the demand for its service Do. The self-financed institution can 
increase its EPS in an attempt to increase quality but must charge 
higher tuition (EPSl) to do so. If there is no increase in demand in 
response to the higher expenditure per student of EPSl, the IHL will 
have reduced enrollments to qo' and the size aspect of prestige will 
suffer. Thus, the law of demand serves as an important constraint 
that underlies the inverse relationship between EPS and size. 
An increase in EPS may cause an increase in the demand for educa-
tional services if the perceived quality of the institution's service 
increases. The increase in EPS to EPSl will be accompanied by an 
increase in demand to Dl and the IHL will not lose as much enrollment 
(qo - ql) as in the initial case with no demand increase. The case 
where the added EPS actually leads to increased size is not illustrated. 
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Figure 2. The Effect of Higher Cost (EPS) on IHL Size 
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low level as the consumers of higher education will ultimately experience 
diminishing marginal utility in the consumption of greater quality and 
become less responsive (in terms of demand increases) to higher quality 
education. 
The IHL administrator will pick a combination of EPS and size that 
maximizes the administrator's utility function. The actual combination 
picked will depend upon the administrator's marginal rate of substitu-
tion of quantity for EPS relative to the marginal rate of transformation 
of quantity for EPS for an institution with a given level of prestige. 
A school administrator having a preference function like that illustrated 
in Figure 1 would chose the combination of EPS and size indicated by 
point M, the tangency of the EPS-Quantity frontier and the administrator's 
indifference curve I. 
Student quality is likely to be a third determinant of the prestige 
of an IHL. The quality of the students at an IHL will have an effect 
on both the status of the institution and the non-pecuniary rewards 
accruing to the faculty. A higher quality student body would be 
expected to: 
1. Provide a more enjoyable teaching experience for the faculty. 
2. Enhance the prestige of the institution as graduates tend to 
be more successful, thus reflecting on the quality of the 
institution. 
3. Enhance the attractiveness of the school to potential students. 
To increase the average quality of the student population, the 
administrators of the IHL can enforce more stringent admission standards. 
Minimum required entrace exam scores can be raised as a means of 
screening out lower quality students. The effect that greater student 
quality has on an institution's EPS and size depends, of course, on the 
effect that quality differences have on demand. 
It is unclear, unfortunately, how student quality will affect the 
demand for an institution's services. Attempts to increase the quality 
of the student population may reduce the demand for the institution's 
educational services as a greater number of students are precluded from 
attending the institution because of the higher admission standards. 
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In this case, a conflict would exist between the objectives of large 
size and high student quality. Increasing student quality would result 
in an institution with a given EPS (and tuition charge) being of smaller 
size in terms of enrollment. Alternatively, tightening admissions 
standards in order to increase student quality would cause an inward 
shift in the IHL's EPS-size frontier. 
The effect that increased student quality has on EPS and size when 
greater student quality reduces the demand for the institution's 
services is illustrated in Figure 3. An IHL with a demand for educa-
tional services of Do and per student expenditure of EPSo, charging 
full cost tuition, will be of size No. Do is assumed to be the demand 
with relatively low admissions standards. The institution can increase 
the quality of the student population by enforcing more stringent 
admissions standards, but this will shift the demand curve to the left 
as some potential students are "priced" out of the market by the higher 
admissions requirements. With the same EPS (and tuition) the enrollment 
at the institution falls to Nl. For the school to maintain an 
enrollment of No after the change in admissions policy, the EPS would 
have to fall to EPSl or the school would have to lower the tuition 
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Figure 3. One Possible Effect of Greater Student Quality 
on IHL Enrollment 
from government or private grants and gifts or by borrowing. Raising 
admissions standards will, therefore, cause the EPS-size frontier to 
shift to the southwest as the demand for the ~HL's service falls. 
The opposite would hold true if the greater student quality 
increased demand. In this case, the EPS-size frontier for the institu-
tion that increased student body quality would shift to the right as 
increasing student quality increased the demand for that IHL's service. 
Students may prefer an education at an institution with a reputation 
for high quality students as this would enhance their learning experi-
ence and possibly improve their job opportunities. 
The purpose of this study is to test the implications of this 
model for differences in the behavior of private and public IHLs caused 
by different revenue constraints and type of control. The administra-
tors of both private and public institutions are assumed to have the 
same objective, that of maximizing status or prestige. An important 
difference between institutions is the revenue sources available to the 
IHL. In general, private IHLs rely more on student tuition and fees 
than do public colleges and universities. A larger proportion of a 
public IHL's revenue is obtained from third parties, primarily the 
state and federal governments. 
In the 1978-79 academic year, tuition and fees paid by students 
amounted to only 13.2 percent of the total current revenue of public 
IHLs while 36.5 percent of private IHL revenues were obtained from 
students. The remaining funds for both type of schools were obtained 
from federal, state and local governments and private gifts and grants. 
Public IHLs relied more on state appropriations (44.2 percent) than did 
private institutions (2.1 percent) while private schools obtained 
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10 percent of their funds from private gifts and public IHLs received 
only 2.3 percent from private sources (10). 
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This model of educational institution behavior stresses an objective 
function containing large size (enrollments), educational quality, and 
the quality of the student body. The important difference between 
private and public IHLs that implies different behavior in the context 
of this model is the differential burden placed upon students to finance 
their education. Since schools differ greatly in their reliance on 
student tuition payments to finance the institution, and any differences 
in tuition payments will affect the choices among alternative combinations 
of size, quality, and student body characteristics, IHL behavior should 
reflect these differences. As will be demonstrated below, institutions 
that rely less heavily on student tuition and fees are expected to 
have greater EPS, ceteris paribus, than do institutions requiring that 
students finance a greater proportion of their education. 
Figure 4 illustrates the demand for educational services at 
hypothetical private and public colleges with equal quality students. 
Both schools have average costs (expenditure per student) of EPSo 
which implies that the institutions are of equal "quality". For 
simplicity, assume the private college requires students to pay full 
cost tuition equal to EPSo. Therefore, with demand equal to D, the 
private school will be of size Pri. 
Assume that the public college, with equal EPS and demand conditions, 
charges a tuition of 50 percent of the full cost (EPSo/2). The state-
supported college, by not having to charge as high a tuition because of 
greater government support, can be larger than the private school of 
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Figure 4. The Effect that Greater Reliance on Non-Students 
for Revenue has on IHL Size 
38 
Pub which is greater than the enrollment at the state-supported IHL (Pri) 
as the difference between the tuition charged by the private and public 
schools allows the state supported institution to attract more students. 
This difference in size for a given level of EPS and demand implies 
that the EPS-quantity tradeof f curve for a college receiving less 
non-student revenue as a percentage of total revenues will be inside 
the frontier for a school that benefits from greater government and 
private support. Consider two institutions, one private and one public, 
equal in every respect except revenue sources. With equal expenditure 
per student the public college can have larger enrollments as the 
tuition charged will be less than that charged at the private school. 
This initial level of expenditures is shown in Figure 5 as EPSo. Two 
points, showing one of the many EPS-enrollment possibilities for the 
two schools are the points Pri and Pub, the public institution being 
the larger at the initial level of quality. These correspond to the 
enrollment levels Pri and Pub illustrated in Figure 4. 
Under the assumption that the demand for each college's services 
responds in the same way to tuition and quality changes it can be 
demonstrated that the frontier for the private institution, which 
relies to a greater extent upon students for revenues, will lie inside 
that of the state supported school. This is due to the fact that as 
higher expenditures per student are made to increase quality, the 
private institution's tuition will rise by a greater amount than that 
at the public institution. This will reduce the quantity of educational 
services demanded at private IHLs by a greater amount than the lower 
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Figure 5. EPS-Enrollment Frontiers for Two IHLs that 
Differ in Source of Revenue 
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Since private colleges with EPS equal to that of public colleges 
are smaller at the initial level of "quality" and tuition rates are 
expected to rise more for a given increase in EPS at private schools, 
these IHLs that place greater reliance on students for revenues will 
have greater reductions in enrollment for equal increases in EPS. This 
conclusion is subject to the assumption that the demand for the two 
types of institution's services responds equally to perceived quality 
increases brought about by an EPS increase and the resulting tuition 
hikes. Under these demand response conditions, the EPS-size frontier 
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for the private and state supported IHLs will differ. The typical 
private institution's frontier will be inside that of the state supported 
IHL and the private IHL will suffer greater enrollment losses with equal 
per student expenditure increases. This conclusion is demonstrated 
mathematically below. 
N n(t, EPS, SBQ) (1) 
This equation represents the demand for educational services by 
students, with t being the tuition charged at the IHL, EPS the 
expenditure per student, and SBQ the quality of the institution's 
student body. The expected partial derivatives with respect to t and 
EPS are: aN/at < 0, and aN/aEPS > 0, where the former illustrates the 
law of demand, and the latter implies a rightward shift of the demand 
curve caused by an increase in quality associated with an increase in 
EPS. As mentioned earlier, the effect that increased student body 
quality has on demand is uncertain as higher student quality makes the 
institution more desirable therefore increasing demand on the one hand, 
but may tend to reduce enrollment demand via more stringent admission 
standards, on the other. Thus, the sign of 8N/8SBQ is unknown. 
Equation (2) assumes a simple linear relationship between the 
tuition charged at an IHL and the EPS. 
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t k * EPS (2) 
where k is equal to the proportion of the IHL's total revenue that is 
obtained from student tuition payments and fees. A full-cost college 
or university would have a k equal to unity. Cohn's (9) aggregate 
data suggest k is about .12 for state supported IHLs and about .36 for 
private institutions. From (2) dt/dEPS = k. An increase in EPS 
increases the tuition charged to students by k times the expenditure 
increase. 
Totally differentiating (1), the demand function, yields 
dN (8N/8t)dt + (8N/8EPS)dEPS + (8N/8SBQ)dSBQ 
Assuming that EPS and tuition are directly linked according to (3), 
k*dEPS can be substituted for dt. A change in EPS may also have an 
effect on the quality of an institution's student body. More able 
students may be attracted to the more expensive "quality" IHLs. If 
greater EPS does attract better students, and the higher caliber of 
(3) 
the IHL's student body makes the institution more attractive to other 
students, then the demand for the IHL's services will be further 
affected. (8N/8SBQ)(8SBQ/8EPS)dEPS represents the increase in education 
demand associated with an increase in student body quality caused by 
an increase in EPS. The substitution of k*dEPS for dt, and including 
the effect that changing EPS has on student quality provides 
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dN (oN/ot)k*dEPS + (oN/oEPS)dEPS + (oN/oSBQ)(oSBQ/oEPS)dEPS (3') 
This equation shows the net effect of a change in EPS which causes a 
change in tuition of k*dEPS and a change in student quality of 
(dSBQ/oEPS) dEPS. 
The first term on the right side of (3') is the change in the 
quantity of educational services demanded as a result of a total tuition 
change of k times the change in EPS. This term is negative for dEPS > 0. 
The second term in the right side of (3') is the change in demand brought 
about by a change in EPS, this being positive for dEPS > 0. The last 
term on the righthand side of (3') is the change in demand caused by the 
effect that a change in EPS has on the quality of an institution's 
student body. Solving (3') for the EPS-size tradeoff (dN/dEPS) yields 
dN/dEPS (oN/ot)k + oN/oEPS + (oN/oSBQ)(oSBQ/oEPS) 
This illustrates that the rate at which EPS and size can be exchanged 
along the frontier in Figure 5 has four determinants. 
(4) 
First, the tradeoff depends upon the slope of the demand function, 
oN/ot. As costs and tuition increase with EPS, the quantity demanded 
falls. The amount by which tuition changes with dEPS, k, is the 
second determinant of the tradeoff, a larger k meaning a greater tuition 
increase and a greater reduction in quantity demanded, given dEPS and 
the slope of the demand function. Third, the shift in the demand 
function in response to a change in EPS, oN/oEPS, tends to increase 
the quantity of educational services provided. Finally, the effect 
that student body quality changes have on demand (oN/oSBQ), and the 
influence of EPS on student body quality (oSBQ/oEPS), will affect 
demand, and therefore, enrollment, as EPS changes. 
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Under conditions where oN/ot, oN/oEPS, oN/oSBQ, and oSBQ/oEPS are 
equal for both types of institutions, the tradeoff between quality and 
quantity will differ as k, the fraction of per student expenditures that 
students pay, differs. The greater reliance of private IHLs on students 
for operating revenues implies that private institutions will be made 
more aware of the "Law of Demand", that is, greater quality will be 
achieved only at the expense of greater relative enrollment losses. 
Public institutions, with their greater non-student sources of revenue, 
can generally pass on a larger proportion of expenditure increases to 
taxpayers and relatively less to students and therefore will not suffer 
as great a loss in enrollment. 
This differential in the EPS-size tradeoff is illustrated in 
Figure 5. Consider two institutions, one receiving a large part of 
its revenues from government grants or private gifts and the other 
relying more heavily on students for revenues. For simplicity, the 
institution obtaining the larger part of its revenues from non-students 
will be referred to as the "public" IHL, the other labeled a "private" 
institution. These institutions are assumed to have equal EPS (EPSo) 
and are of sizes Pub and Pri respectively. If both institutions 
increase EPS from EPSo to EPSl, the private institution increases 
tuition more than the public one for the same increase in EPS, and the 
private school loses more enrollment; its enrollment falling to Pril, 
compared to the enrollment loss at the state IHL, to Publ. Equation (4) 
shows that dN/dEPS will be greater in absolute value the greater the 
value of k. Under the assumptions that oN/oEPS, oN/ot, oN/oSBQ, and 
oSBQ/oEPS are equal for both institutions, oN/oEPS will be larger in 
absolute value if negative (or smaller if positive) for a college that 
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places greater reliance on students for revenue (larger k). More size 
is sacrificed by the institution that relies more heavily on students 
for revenue for equal increases in EPS. As shown in Figure 5, the 
institution that charges a tuition rate that covers a greater proportion 
of its per student expenditure (larger k), will have a lower EPS than 
the IHL of equal size that receives greater government and private gift 
support. The frontiers illustrate that an IHL with the greater K value 
and the lower frontier would have an EPS of EPSl at a size of Pril 
while an equal size IHL with the lower k, and a frontier which lies 
to the right of the other institution's, could have an EPS of EPS2. 
This analysis implies that two institutions with similar demand 
conditions, differing only in sources of revenue, will have different 
EPS-size frontiers as shown in Figure 5. The administrators of an IHL 
which relies more heavily on the student as a source of revenue will 
face a tradeoff frontier that lies inside of and has a lower slope 
than that faced by the administrators of an IHL that obtains a greater 
proportion of its revenue from non-students. These differences in the 
constraints that the administrators face suggest a difference in IHL 
behavior. IHLs of equal size and demand conditions but alternative 
sources of revenue will have different EPS, the institution receiving 
greater non-student revenues as a percentage of the institutions total 
revenues will have greater EPS. 
The following chapter will develop the methodology that will be 
employed to test the implications of the model. The data sources 
and sampling procedures used will also be explained. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE HYPOTHESES 
The Prestige Maximization model of IHLs presented above suggests 
that systematic differences between private and public colleges exist 
because of the differences in their sources of revenue. The 
hypothesis to be tested was developed in the previous chapter and stated 
that IHLs of equal size and demand conditions will have different EPS 
depending upon the sources of revenue for the institution. This 
hypothesis will be tested by employing multiple regression techniques 
to estimate an expenditure per student, or average cost, function for 
different samples of institutions of higher learning. 
The variables assumed to have an influence on an IHL's EPS are the 
size of the institution, the institutions adminissions standards, 
differences in the institution's sources of revenue, the per capita 
income of the state where the IHL is located, and the onwership (public 
or private) of the institution. Variations in these determinants are 
expected to alter the constraints that the administrators of the 
institutions face, and such alterations will be reflected in the 
administrators' choices and the institutions' behavior. 
The model presented in Chapter III suggests that, ceteris paribus, 
larger institutions will have lower EPS. After controlling for other 
determinants of EPS, an inverse relationship between EPS and enrollment 
is expected. 
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The selectivity of an institution in its admissions policies is 
expected to affect an institution's EPS; however, the impact that 
differences in admissions standards and the quality of an IHL's student 
body have on an institution's EPS-size frontier is uncertain. A change 
in the quality of an IHL's student body brought about by a change in 
admissions standards could either increase or decrease the demand for 
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the institution's services. More stringent admissions standards could 
shift an IHL's EPS-size frontier inward because of the reduction in 
demand associated with these higher admissions standards. In this case 
there would be an inverse relationship between EPS and admissions 
standards, ceteris paribus. While the more stringent admissions policies 
would reduce demand, the greater student quality associated with the 
higher standards could be expected to increase the demand for the IHL's 
services. If this effect were to outweigh that of the more stringent 
admissions policies, the institutions EPS-size frontier would shift 
outward and greater ESP would be associated with any enrollm~nt level. 
As specific institutional data measuring admissions standards could not 
be obtained, no admissions policy or student quality variable will be 
included in the estimation of the EPS functions. A discussion of the 
biases that this omission could introduce into the results is included 
in the following chapter. 
As shown in Chapter III, the revenue sources for an IHL may have a 
great impact on EPS. The ease with which an IHL can obtain funds from 
parties other than students will affect the IHL's ability to attain 
large size (by keeping tuition low) and maintain high quality education 
(via high EPS). The more government and private grant and gift 
revenues an IHL receives, the greater the institution's ability to 
increase EPS without a loss of students. The greater the proportion of 
total revenues that the institution obtains from non-students, the 
greater the institution's EPS, ceteris paribus. The expected relation-
ship between an institution's non-student revenues as a percentage of 
total IHL revenues and EPS is positive. 
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Per capita income will affect EPS as income is the most important 
determinant of the ability of students (or their families) and taxpayers 
to pay for higher education. Higher per capita personal income is 
expected to have a positive influence on EPS. Higher per capita income 
will also increase the ability of the state government to levy taxes 
for the purpose of funding education, thus having a positive influence 
on EPS. Higher personal income will also increase private gifts and 
grants to institutions of higher learning. 
IHL behavior is expected to be influenced by the objectives of and 
the constraints faced by the administrators of the institution. There 
are no reasons to expect differences in the overall objectives of the 
administrators of private IHLs compared with those of public institu-
tions; however, the difference in the ownership of the institutions is 
expected to affect the constraints faced by administrators. The 
behavior of the administrators of private and public IHLs is expected 
to differ as a result of these differences in constraints. 
The theory of property rights and related empirical work suggest 
that the difference that exists between the degree of separation of 
the owners and the manager-administrators of institutions will have 
an impact on the relative behavior of private and public IHLs 
(Furubotn and Pejovich (14), Davies (12), Newhouse (27), Clarkson (9)). 
In the case of the state supported (public) IHL, the owners of the 
institution (taxpayers) have no rights to any benefits or residual 
income created by efficient operation of the institution that their tax 
dollars support. Taxpayers will receive no benefits from any increased 
value of the institution. The taxpaying owners of the public IHLs are 
completely removed from the management of these institutions. The 
managers of a public institution have a relatively free hand in the 
purchase of and use of the inputs in the education production process 
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as the owners of the institution would not be expected to engage in any 
monitoring of management. Managers are assumed to engage in the pursuit 
of pecuniary and non-pecuniary sources of utility to a greater extent 
than would the managers of a privately-owned institution. 
The owners of private IHLs are less removed from the managers-
administrators of the institution and therefore face lower monitoring 
costs. These owners also have private property rights over the institu-
tion and will benefit by engaging in the monitoring of management as 
the rewards from efficient operation are capitalized in the value of 
the institution. For these reasons, the managers of the private IHL 
are expected to face more stringent constraints over the use of inputs. 
The managers of the private institutions are not as free to use school 
resources to increase their utility as are the administrators of public 
institutions. Public institutions are therefore expected to have 
greater EPS, ceteris paribus, than private institutions as the managers 
of private IHLs are, to a greater extent, constrained to use school 
resources in a manner more consistent with efficient operation. 
The existence of these relationships is an empirical question. 
The implications of the model, as described above, were tested by 
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using regression techniques to estimate a linear specification of the 
general function 
EPS f(Enrollment, Type of Ownership, Non-student 
Revenue as a Percentage of Total IHL Revenue, 
Per Capita Income) 
(5) 
The relationships between the independent variables and EPS are assumed 
to be linear such that standard multiple regression can be used. 
The sign and significance of the revenue variable provides a test of 
the most important implication of the model developed in the third 
chapter; namely, that the relationship between the percentage of an 
IHL's total revenues that are obtained from non-students and the 
institutions EPS is positive. If the non-student revenue variable has 
a significant and positive coefficient, the hypothesis based on the 
model cannot be rejected. This result would imply that non-student 
sources of an IHL's revenues provide the administrators of the institu-
tion with the opportunity to use more resources per student than they 
could in the absence of non-student sources of revenue. This outcome 
would contradict the stereotype that private schools are of greater 
"quality" than public IHLs. It is true that the average EPS for private 
schools is greater than that of state supported IHLs but this may be 
due to the fact that the average private IHL is smaller than the public 
IHL and cannot take advantage of the economies associated with larger 
size. It is also possible that the administrators of private IHLs 
place more emphasis on the EPS component of prestige and obtain a 
prestige maximizing combination of EPS and size at a point farther 
to the northwest on their EPS-size frontier. The Prestige Maximization 
Model is consistent with an observed high EPS at private schools, given 
that these schools are generally much smaller than their public 
counterparts. 
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The test of the hypothesis that property rights arrangements will 
affect the constraints faced by the administrators of IHLs and, therefore, 
influence IHL behavior as reflected in EPS is accomplished by testing 
the sign and significance of the type of ownership variable. The type 
of ownership variable is a non-continuous dummy variable with a value 
of one if the observation is from a private school and zero if from a 
state supported IHL. If the coefficient of this dummy variable is 
found to be significantly different than zero, the hypothesis that 
private and public IHLs have different EPS cannot be rejected. If the 
coefficient is significant and negative, the hypothesis suggested by the 
theory concerning the effect of property rights on enterprise performance 
cannot be rejected. A statistically significant and negative type of 
ownership dummy variable will provide evidence that private IHLs, 
because of the more stringent constraints placed on managers (admini-
strators) by owners that have property rights in the private institu-
tions, have lower EPS or average costs. This result would be consistent 
with previous findings on the effect of differences in property rights. 
Data for the estimation of the EPS function were obtained from a 
Department of Education data tape. The tape contains information from 
the Higher Education General Information Survey (REGIS XI) which 
includes financial and enrollment statistics for a large number of 
private and public IHLs of many types. In addition to differences in 
IHLs based on the factors discussed in the previous chapter, there are 
important differences in the types of programs available, the level of 
• 
degree offerings, and the emphasis placed on vocational versus liberal 
education and research. The institutions in the REGIS data file are 
classified by the·National Center for Education Statistics according to 
such differences in institutional program content, emphasis, and level 
of degree offerings. These classifications are used in this study to 
partition the samples of institutions to obtain greater homogeneity 
for the e'stimation of the EPS functions. 
The model as developed in the previous chapter suggests that the 
EPS at an institution would be affected by the institution's admissions 
standards. Although no information was available concerning any 
differences between student body characteristics at different types 
of institutions as classified by the NCES, studies have been done 
suggesting that private IHLs may attract and enroll more able students 
than do public colleges and universities. 
Anderson (1) used data from the 1964-65 and 1972-73 National Merit 
Scholarship Qualifying Tests to construct an index of an institution's 
attractiveness to able student. An able student was defined as a 
high school junior that scored among the top one-third of the students 
taking the test. The attractiveness index was computed as the number 
of able students that selected an IHL in either year, divided by the 
number of entering freshmen for that year. After comparing these 
indices for private and public colleges and universities, Anderson 
concluded that the average private IHL was more attractive to able 
students than the average public school in both years, but the gap 
between the attractiveness of the two types of schools was narrowed. 
Lehr and Newton (21) found evidence that freshmen at private IHLs 
have higher high school GPSa than do the entering classes at public 
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institutions. Student profiles were constructed for different types of 
IHLs using linear discriminant analysis with data from the Oregon 
Student Resource Survey of a random sample of 2,100 students attending 
the state's two and four-year institutions. The discriminant function 
coefficients for the three classes of IHLs indicated that private four-
year colleges were more likely to enroll students with greater high 
school GPAs and higher family income than the two-year or four-year 
public colleges. 
A positive relationship between student ability and family income 
was detected in a study of the distributional aspects of enrollments in 
higher education by Corazzini, Dugan, and Grabowski (11). Data from a 
10 percent sample of the high school senior taking the SAT by December 
of 1969 indicated a strong positive relationship between family income 
and the students score on the verbal section of the SAT. The 3,200 
students in the sample were classified according to income quartile, 
and the percentage of the students in each of these quartiles that 
scored between 200 and 400, 400 and 600, and 600 to 800 on the SAT was 
calculated. While only 6.8 percent of the students in the lowest 
income quartile scored in the 600 to 800 range on the SAT, 24.1 percent 
of the students in the highest income group scored in that SAT range. 
Almost one third (30 percent) of the students in the lowest income 
quartile scored in the lowest range of the SAT, but only 15 percent 
of the most well-to-do students scored in this range. This income-SAT 
relationship provides an alternative explanation for the apparent 
"preference" that high ability students have for private IHLs. Higher 
income families can more easily afford to send their children to the 
more expensive private IHLs, and the students from these affluent 
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households are generally of greater ability as measured by college 
entrance exam scores. 
These studies suggest that scholastic differences do exist between 
the student populations at private and public institutions. 
Unfortunately, no studies could be found concerning student quality 
differences that may exist between the other classifications of 
institutions that are used by the NCES and employed in this study. 
The only operational measures of student characteristics or admissions 
standards that could be found were minimum entrance exam requirements 
such as minimum scores on the ACT and SAT exams, and GPA requirements 
for admission to an institution. The ideal study would include an 
index of the average SAT or ACT score for the entering freshman class. 
These data are needed on an institution-by-institution basis, and the 
testing agencies will not provide this information for individual 
institutions. For this reason, a student quality or admissions 
stan~ards variable is not included in the estimation of the EPS 
functions. These admissions differences, it is hoped, will be somewhat 
accounted for by the partitioning of the data samples by the NCES 
classifications discussed above. 
A linear specification of equation (S) was estimated with cross 
sectional samples for the DOE financial and enrollment data file. The 
survey data are for the 1977-78 academic year. The financial 
statistics used to measure the variables included in the EPS function, 
the partitioned samples used, and the results of the estimation of 





Data for the estimation of the EPS function were obtained from the 
Department of Education on a tape that includes financial and enrollment 
data for over 3,000 institutions of higher learning. Samples were drawn 
from four different NCES classifications of institutions: comprehensive 
institutions, general baccalaureate institutions, multiprogram two-year 
institutions, and doctoral level institutions. Attempts were made to 
draw additional samples from other NCES classifications, such as 
specialized institutions (includes schools of religion and theology, 
medical schools, engineering schools, and business and management 
schools), but the number of observations in the samples were either too 
small for meaningful statistical analysis or there were too few private 
or public school observations to allow for comparisons between institu-
tions on the basis of differences in type of ownership. 
The NCES classifies IHLs according to the number of degrees granted 
and the types of programs offered during the academic year in question. 
These classifications are assigned on the basis of the degree data that 
the institutions provide to the NCES on the "Degrees Conferred" portion 
of the REGIS survey. IHLs are partitioned using these NCES classifi-
cations in this study for two reasons. First, IHLs are so heterogeneous 
in program offerings and degree emphasis that partitioning of the 
samples is necessary to control for the variety of IHL product 
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characteristics. Differences in academic programs will obviously affect 
an IHL's expenditures per student. Second, evidence exists which 
suggests that student quality may differ between different types of 
institutions (Anderson (1), Corazzini et al. (11), Lehr and Newton (21)). 
The model developed in Chapter III suggests that student characteristics 
may influence EPS. 
IHLs that are included in the NCES classification "Comprehensive 
Institutions" are institutions that offer a number of different post-
baccalaureate programs but are not heavily involved in doctoral granting 
programs. This category contains institutions that grant fewer than 
30 doctoral degrees per year or offer fewer than three doctoral programs 
while granting at least 30 post-baccalaureate (masters) degrees. These 
IHLs also must have an inter-disciplinary program at the post-
baccalaureate level or grant degrees in three or more post-baccalaureate 
areas. A sample was drawn from this classification of IHLs with 198 
observations including 72 private institutions and 126 public IHLs. 
Institutions classified by NCES as "General Baccalaureate 
Institutions" have programs that are primarily at the undergraduate level. 
Either 30 or fewer post graduate degrees are offered or less than three 
post graduate programs are available at these institutions. Degrees 
are granted in at least three program areas or a program at the under-
graduate level in interdisciplinary studies is offered at these IHLs. 
The sample drawn from this classification has 149 observations, 74 from 
public and 75 from private institutions. 
A third sample was drawn from the NCES classification of 
"Multiprogram Two-Year Institutions". These institutions are schools 
that offer degrees or awards in two or more program areas with 75 
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percent of these for work below the bachelor's level. Forty-four of the 
100 observations from this classification were from private institutions, 
the remaining 56 being government-owned institutions. 
The fourth and last sample was made up of doctoral level institu-
tions which are those institutions that grant a minimum of 30 doctoral-
level degrees in three or more different program areas or, alternatively, 
have an inter-disciplinary program at the doctoral-level. These 
institutions are further classified by NCES into those with and without 
medical schools. A sample of 75 IHLs without medical schools was 
selected, containing 25 private IHLs and 50 public institutions. 
The general function that was estimated for each of these four 
samples is 
EPS = f(ENROLL, D, k, SPCY) (6) 
The ENROLL variable is the full-time graduate and undergraduate enroll-
ment at a specific IHL. The square of the enrollment variable was also 
included in the estimation of the EPS function to detect any nonlinearity 
in the relationship between EPS and the size of the institution. 
The type of ownership variable, D, is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the observation is from a private institution and set equal to zero 
otherwise. All institutions in the DOE file were assigned this type of 
ownership variable. 
k is the fraction of the IHLs total revenues that are obtained from 
non-students; it was calculated by subtracting student tuition and fees 
(adjusted for monies remitted through scholarships and fellowships) from 
an institution's total current funds revenues and dividing that difference 
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by total current funds revenues. Total current funds revenues are the 
sum of tuition and fees; federal, state and local appropriations, grants 
and contracts; private gifts, grants and contracts; endowment incomes; 
sales and services of educational activities, auxiliary enterprises, 
hospitals and independent operations; and other sources of income. The 
sum of these revenue sources was provided as a separate variable, total 
current funds revenues, in each institution's financial record. k could 
range from 0 to 1; however, all institutions received some revenue from 
students and non-students alike and no values of 0 or 1 were found. The 
highest k value calculated was .99 and the lowest value was about 
10 percent. 
State per capita personal income (SPCY) measures for 1978 were 
obtained from the July, 1977 issue of The Survey of Current Business. 
The SPCY variable measures the per capita personal income in thousands 
of dollars in the state where the IHL is located. Each IHL record on 
the DOE data tape includes a state variable which was used to match SPCY 
with the institutions in each state. 
The independent variable, expenditure per student (EPS), was 
calculated by dividing the IHL total current educational and general 
expenditures by full time undergraduate and graduate enrollment. This 
expenditure measure includes expenditures for instruction, research, 
public service, academic support, student services, institutional 
support, operation and maintenance of plant, and scholarships and 
fellowships. 
Except for the enrollment-EPS relationship, the relationships 
between the independent variables and EPS were assumed to be linear. 
The assumption of linearity is necessary so that standard linear 
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regression techniques can be employed to estimate the relationships 
between the dependent and independent variables. Nonlinearity in the 
enrollment-EPS relationship was incorporated into the estimation of the 
EPS function in the same fashion that was employed by Maynard (26). 
This is done by including the square of the enrollment variable as an 
additional independent variable. If the relationship between EPS and 
enrollment is not linear, the coefficient of this variable will be 
nonzero. The equation that was estimated is 
EPS Bo + Bl*ENROLL + B2*ENROLL2 + B3*D + B4*k + 
(7) 
where 
BS*SPCY + e 
EPS expenditure per student, 
ENROLL = full time enrollment, 
ENROLL2 = ENROLL*ENROLL 
D 0 if the observation is from a public IHL, 1 if private, 
k fraction of IHL total revenues obtained from non-
students, 
SPCY per capita personal income in state where IHL is 
located, and 
e = random disturbance term with expected value of 0 and 
constant variance. 
The Prestige Maximization Model suggests that specific relation-
ships exist between these independent variables and the dependent 
variable EPS. Of particular interest is the size, significance, and 
sign of the regression coefficient B4 which provides an estimate of the 
partial derivative of EPS with respect to a change in k, the source of 
revenue variable. The model suggests that aEPS/ak > 0, or that B4 will 
be positive. 
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The sign and significance of B3, the coefficient of the type of 
ownership variable, provides a test of the hypothesis that EPS differs 
between IHLs that are subject to different types of ownership, private 
or public. Although the model developed in Chapter III provides little 
insight into the expected relationship between type of ownership and 
EPS, economic theory and the related empirical work suggests that a 
negative coefficient should be anticipated. If this is found to be the 
case, the empirical evidence would be consistent with the hypothesis 
that private IHLs, ceteris paribus, are more "cost-effective" than their 
public counterparts. The value of the estimate of B3 can be interpreted 
as a measure of the shift in the IHL EPS function due to differences in 
the type of ownership. B3 is expected to be negative and significant, 
indicating that lower EPS is associated with private ownership. It 
needs to be pointed out, however, that there can be other influences 
of the type of ownership on IHL behavior besides those expected as 
consequences of different constraints placed on IHL administrators. 
Microeconomic theory suggests that Bl and B2, the regression 
coefficients on the enrollment and the squared enrollment variables, 
will have negative and positive values respectively. If IHL EPS (or 
cost) functions are consistent with those suggested by theory, EPS 
should fall over an initial range where economies of size are present. 
This result would be reflected in a statistically significant and 
negative regression coefficient on the ENROLL variable. The existence 
of diseconomies of size would lead to the EPS function ultimately 
turning upward at some larger size. The presence of diseconomies of 
size would be reflected in a significantly positive coefficient for the 
variable ENROLL2. State by state estimates of cost functions for state 
supported institutions by Maynard (26) confirmed the existence of U 
shaped long-run average cost functions for IHLs and these results are 
anticipated here. 
SPCY is assumed to measure the strength of the private and public 
demand for higher education services, with greater demand reflected in 
higher EPS at IHLs located in states with greater per capita personal 
income. Thus, it is anticipated that the regression coefficient BS 
will be significantly greater than zero. 
The results from the estimation of the expenditure per student 
function (6) for the four samples are summarized in Table I. In the 
first three regression equations, all regression coefficients are of 
the expected sign except for the type of ownership variable, and all 
of the regression coefficients are significant at the .05 level or 
better, except for the parameter associated with ENROLL in the EPS 
function for doctoral and general baccalaureate institutions. All of 
the estimated regression equations, save the equation estimated for 
the two-year institutions, are significant at the one percent level. 
The equation for the two-year institutions is insignificant, with only 
one explanatory variable, state per capita personal income, significant 
at the five percent level. 
For all three of the significant EPS functions, evidence of 
economies of size exists. However, only the EPS function for 
Comprehensive Institutions indicates the presence of significant 
diseconomies associated with larger size. B2, the coefficient on the 
enrollment squared variable, is statistically positive for that class 
of institutions. The regression coefficients on ENROLL2 for the 
Doctoral and Baccalaueate functions have the expected positive signs 
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TABLE I 
THE REGRESSION RESULTS 
Numher Number Number 
Sample Obs. Pri. Pub. ENROLL ENROLL2 D k SPCY RSQR F 
Doctoral 75 25 50 -.4133 7.19 10-6 11, 404 39,426 1, 711 .76 46.25 
(-2.19)a (1.75) (7.73)b (6.96)b (3.66)b 
Comprehensive 198 72 126 -1.069 4.60 10-5 2,954 8,124 1,583 .27 14.49 
(-3.65)b (2.43)a (2.4l)a (3.32)b (5.03)b 
Baccalaureate 149 75 74 -.747 4.85 10-5 1,645 5,960 939 .32 13.65 
(-2.48)a ( 1. 22) (3.22)b (4.84)b (5.76)b 
Two-Year 100 44 56 -.876 6.81 10-5 -427 509 630 .06 1.22 
(-1. 54) (.97) (-.35) (. 21) (2.04)a 




but are not significant at the .05 level. Not only does the EPS function 
for Comprehensive Universities suggest significant diseconomies, but it 
also exhibits the greatest initial cost savings due to size economies as 
enrollment increases from low levels. Bl for the Comprehensive 
Institutions is larger in absolute value (1.069) than the coefficients 
for either Doctoral (.41JJ) or Baccalaureate (.767) cost functions. 
These results are consistent with Maynard's (26) findings of size 
economies, but they do not confirm the slight diseconomies associated 
with very large enrollments except in the case of the Comprehensive 
Universities. Maynard found that minimum per-student costs were 
obtained at an enrollment level of 5,JOO students for the four-year 
state supported IHLs in his sample. The results of the estimation of 
the EPS function for private and public Comprehensive Universities 
suggest that minimum EPS is not achieved until enrollment reaches 
11,000. 
In the three significant regression equations, the coefficients 
on the type of ownership variable are significant and positive. These 
results do not support the hypothesis that private IHLs have lower EPS 
after controlling for size and other differences. The significant and 
positive value of the BJ coefficients suggest that private IHLs have 
higher costs per student than do their public counterparts. The values 
of BJ: 11,404, 2,954, and 1,645 measure the upward shift in the EPS 
functions associated with private ownership of Doctoral, Comprehensive, 
and Baccalaureate institutions respectively. The results suggest that 
an average private doctoral institution has expenditures per student 
that are approximately $11,000 greater than the EPS at a state supported 
doctoral institution. The cost differences are not so startling at the 
Comprehensive and Baccalaureate institutions, only approximately $3,000 
and $1,600, respectively. 
The major hypothesis offered by the Prestige Maximization Model is 
that EPS is influenced by the sources of revenue available to an IHL. 
Specifically, institutions that receive more financial support from 
non-students are expected to have greater EPS or costs per student. 
The estimates of the EPS functions provide a test of this hypothesis. 
The regression coefficient on k, the fraction of total IHL current fund 
revenue that is obtained from non-students, is expected to be greater 
than zero, and the regression results confirmed this. The estimate of 
B4 in all four regression equations is positive, and in the three 
significant equations the estimates of B4 are significant at the .01 
level. The B4 values provide an estimate of the increase in per student 
cost associated with a one unit increase in k. A one unit increase in 
k, however, implies the comparison of an IHL that receives absolutely 
no revenues from non-students with an institution that is totally 
dependent on public and private gifts and grants for current fund 
revenues. A more intuitive interpretation of B4 is obtained by 
dividing these estimates by 100, which provides an estimate of the 
increase in EPS related to a one percent increase in k. Ceteris 
paribus, a one percent increase in IHL reliance on non-students 
for revenues raises EPS by 394, 81, and 60 dollars at doctoral, 
comprehensive, and baccalaureate institutions, respectively. These 
results are consistent with the hypothesis suggested by the model, 
that non-student sources of revenue cause the EPS-size frontier that 
IHL administrators face to shift outward, thus allowing greater EPS 
for an IHL of a given size. 
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The hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between state per 
capita personal income and EPS is also supported by the regression 
results. A positive and statistically significant coefficient on SPCY 
was found for each of the four regression equations estimated, three of 
which are significant at the .01 level. The BS parameter in the esti-
mated EPS function for the sample of two-year institutions was 
significant at the .05 level. This coefficient provides an estimate of 
the increase in EPS associated with a $1,000 increase in per capita 
personal income in the state where the IHL is located. A $1,000 increase 
in SPCY is associated with a $1,700, $1,600, $900, and $600 increase in 
EPS for doctoral, comprehensive, baccalaureate, or two-year institution, 
respectively. 
These results are consistent, of course, with the accepted 
proposition that higher education is a normal good. The doctoral and 
comprehensive institutions show larger increases in spending per 
student with greater SPCY than do the generally smaller baccalaureate 
and two-year institutions. 
Before the results of the three "good" EPS function estimates are 
accepted without qualification, some likely problems associated with 
the estimation of these functions, and the interpretation of the results 
need to be discussed. Some of the common problems encountered with 
this type of microeconometric analysis, such as multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity, and model misspecification, are considered below. 
The regression results for three of the four samples of IHLs 
are consistent with the implications of the Prestige Maximization 
Model developed in Chapter III, however, one should explain the poor 
performance of the model in describing the behavior of the two-year 
institutions. The empirical evidence obtained from the estimation of 
the EPS equation for the sample of two-year institutions does not 
support the implications of the model. Two-year institutions are 
predominantly community colleges, and it seems reasonable to argue that 
they may be more concerned with financial survival than they are with 
the size and quality factors that are emphasized in the model developed 
here. In any event, the Prestige Maximization Model must be rejected 
as an adequate explanation of the behavior of this special class of 
institutions. 
Multicollinearity can create a situation where an estimated 
regression equation has a high R-square, indicating that the equation 
explains a large proportion of the variance of the dependent variable, 
while none or few of the explanatory variables in the equation are 
significant. This is caused by the high standard errors for the 
regression parameters of the variables that are correlated with one 
another (Pindyck and Rubinfeld (29)). Although the regression results 
themselves do not indicate a multicollinearity problem, there is reason 
to suspect correlation between some of the independent variables used 
in the EPS function estimation. One would expect a strong correlation 
between the type of ownership variable, D, and the revenue source 
variable, k, as private schools tend to place greater reliance on 
students for revenues than do state supported institutions. Greater 
values of D (one as opposed to zero) should be associated with lower k 
values. It is also likely that larger institutions rely to a greater 
extent on non-student revenue sources than would small institutions 
so a positive correlation between ENROLL and k is anticipated. 
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Least squares estimates of the function k = Ao + Al*D + A2*ENROLL 
confirms the existence of multicollinearity. D and ENROLL were found 
to be significantly related to k with R2s of .41 and .75 for the 
sample data for the doctoral and comprehensive institutions, 
respectively. In both cases, D was significantly inversely related to 
k with t statistics of -6.61 and -17.7. Enrollment was inversely 
related to kin the doctoral sample data (t = -2.72) but for the 
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comprehensive institutions, it was positively correlated to k (t = 2.67). 
Multicollinearity was also detected in the independent variables from 
the sample of baccalaureate institutions with D and SPCY being inversely 
related to k with t statistics of -11.7 and -4.17 respectively and a 
R2 of .61. 
When independent variables move together, it becomes difficult to 
estimate and interpret the regression coefficients. Regression 
coefficients are estimates of partial derivatives which are the effects 
of a one unit change of an independent variable on the dependent 
variable with all other explanatory variables held constant. When 
regression coefficients are estimated with independent variables that 
tend to move together, there may remain little data in the sample with 
which to accurately estimate the effect that a single independent 
variable has when others are not changing (Pindyck and Rubinfeld (29)). 
When strong multicollinearity exists, caution is necessary in inter-
preting regression results. In the author's judgment, multicollinearity 
was not a fatal problem in this analysis as the correlated independent 
variables were still highly significant. Severe multicollinearity is 
2 usually indicated by a high R along with no or few independently 
significant variables (Pindyck and Rubinfeld (29)). This was not the 
case with the regression estimates of the EPS functions. 
Another modeling problem that is usually associated with cross 
sectional studies is heteroscedasticity. A necessary condition for 
the efficient (least variance) estimation of regression coefficients 
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is that the disturbance term in the regression equation is homoscedastic, 
or has a constant variance. The ordinary least squares estimates of the 
regression coefficients are still unbiased in the presence of 
heteroscedasticity, but the estimated variances of the coefficients 
will be biased (Pindyck and Rubinfeld (29)). 
Constant error variances may be an unreasonable assumption in a 
cross sectional expenditure study such as this. Consider cross-sectional 
studies of industry sales or family spending patterns. It seems 
reasonable to suspect greater volatility in sales and spending for 
larger firms and higher income households, respectively. In the same 
fashion, it may be reasonable to suspect that the variance of the 
error term for smaller IHLs is less than the error variance for larger 
institutions. This type of error variance behavior can be quite 
common in family budget or industrial cross sectional studies (Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld (29)), so as a precaution, a test for heteroscedasticity 
was performed. 
Correcting for heteroscedasticity is very simple if the error 
variances are known. Weighted least squares, employing the known 
standard deviation of the error terms to weight each observation, 
results in a transformed error term with a constant variance, and 
estimation of the model with the transformed variables provides unbiased 
and efficient estimates of the regression coefficients and their 
variances. Unfortunately, the error variances are not known and 
assumptions must be made about the true characteristics of the 
disturbance terms. 
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It is assumed that the error variances in the EPS equation are 
related to the size of the institution in question such that the 
variance of the error term is equal to some constant, C, times the 
square of IHL enrollment. This type of error distribution can be 
detected with the Goldfeld-Quandt test (29, 15) for heteroscedasticity. 
This test was performed for each of the significant regression equations. 
The data for each sample was sorted from smallest to largest by enroll-
ment and divided into two equal sized subsamples, one with the smaller 
IHLs and the other containing the larger institutions. 
Equation (7) was then estimated for the large and small institutions 
separately, and the F statistic, ESSl/ESSs, was calculated. ESSl and 
ESSs are the error sum squares for the regression equations estimated 
with the partitioned samples. If this test statistic, with degrees of 
freedom in the numerator and denominator equal to the degrees of freedom 
for the partitioned samples, has a value in excess of the critical value 
of F at the .05 level of significance, then the hypothesis that the error 
terms have constant variance must be rejected. A large calculated F 
statistic indicates that the error variance for the equation estimated 
for the larger IHLs is greater than that for the smaller IHLs. An F 
statistic in excess of the critical value implies that these error 
variance differences are statistically significant and heteroscedasticity 
is present. In none of the tests were the calculated F statistics 
greater than the critical F value so the hypothesis that the error 
variance is positively related to the size of the IHL was rejected. 
A final complication that should be kept in mind when interpreting 
the results of the estimates of the IHL EPS functions is that of 
specification error. It is assumed in any regression analysis that the 
underlying model has been correctly specified. This assumption allows 
the researcher to accept the resulting estimates of the regression 
coefficients as unbiased and consistent estimates of the true model 
parameters. If, however, relevant variables have been omitted or 
irrelevant variables have been included in the analysis, the subsequent 
parameter estimates may be biased in the case of omitted variables or 
inefficient in the case of included irrelevant variables (29). 
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It is unlikely that any irrelevant variables were included in the 
estimated EPS functions (except, of course, for the two-year institution's 
EPS equation) as the independent variables were generally significant. 
Inefficiency, where the estimates of the variances are larger than 
their true variances, is probably not a problem. 
Unfortunately, the bias associated with the omission of relevant 
explanatory variables might be present, as a variable that the model 
developed in Chapter III suggested as being important was not directly 
included in the EPS function estimation due to a lack of data. A 
measure of student quality was not available on an institution by 
institution basis so this variable was omitted. It was assumed that 
the partitioning of the data into NCES classifications would account 
for any student quality differences, but this may have been an 
unreasonable assumption. 
If the omitted variable is correlated with any of the independent 
variables in the model, a bias may be introduced into the estimation 
of the remaining variables. For example, assume that the omitted 
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variable, a measure of student quality, is positively correlated with the 
type of ownership variable, D. As D changes from zero to one for public 
and private institutions respectively, student quality also varies, 
greater student quality being associated with private IHLs (by assumption). 
Assume that the relevant but omitted student quality variable is 
inversely related to EPS. The presence of an additional effect on EPS 
as D changes from zero to one biases the estimate of the regression 
parameter on D. The estimated coefficient on D would be measuring 
two effects on EPS, the greater EPS due to private onwership and the 
lower EPS due to greater student quality which moves with D. This would 
bias the estimate of the coefficient on D downward. 
Since the relationship between the omitted student quality variable 
and the dependent variable, EPS, is uncertain, it is impossible to 
estimate the bias that may be present in the parameter estimates. 
Studies do suggest that a relationship exists between student quality 
and type of ownership (Anderson (1), Corazzini et al. (11), Lehr and 
Newton (21)), but without knowledge about the way that the omitted 
variable affects EPS, the direction of the bias is unknown. It is 
always possible that the omitted variable is not correlated with any 
of the included independent variables in which case no bias is 
introduced. 
Econometric problems aside, one can draw the conclusion that the 
Prestige Maximization Model developed in Chapter III is supported by 
the empirical evidence provided in this chapter. All of the anticipated 
relationships between the independent variables and EPS suggested by 
the model were confirmed. The main hypothesis that EPS is positively 
influenced by non-student sources of revenue cannot be rejected. The 
only hypothesis that is inconsistent with the evidence provided in this 
chapter is that of a negative impact of private ownership on IHL 
expenditure per student. This erroneous prediction, however, was not 
made on the basis of the model developed here but instead was suggested 
by the theory and empirical studies of the effect of different property 
rights arrangements on industry behavior. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research was to develop and test a micro-
economic model of institutions of higher learning (IHLs). The 
introductory chapter discussed the size and importance of the education 
industry. Although higher education is a source of economic growth and 
provides human capital investment that may help alleviate poverty by 
enhancing earning power, little is known about the allocative and 
technical efficiency aspects of the industry. 
IHL cost studies and theoretical and empirical work on non-profit 
and publicly owned institutions were reviewed in Chapter II. The model 
that was developed in Chapter III is similar to a model of non-profit 
hospital behavior developed by Newhouse (27). In his model, Newhouse 
stressed hospital size, in terms of the number of patients served, 
and service quality, measured by per patient expenditures, as two 
important components of a hospital administrator's utility function. 
The administrator is assumed to pick, subject to the constraints that 
he faces, a combination of size and quality that maximizes his utility. 
In Chapter III, Newhouse's model was extended to apply to IHLs. 
The model was modified to include a third factor, the quality of an 
IHL's student body, as an additional component of an IHL administrator's 
objective function. An administrator is expected to pursue combinations 
of instructional quality, as indicated by expenditure per student (EPS), 
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institutional size (enrollment), and student quality that maximize the 
administrator's utility. The combinations of these IHL characteristics 
that the administrator chooses will depend on the tradeoff s between 
these components of his utility function and his marginal rates of 
substitution between EPS, size, and student quality. 
The hypothesis that was developed and tested in this research 
concerns the effect that different sources of IHL revenue have on IHL 
behavior. The Prestige Maximization Model suggested that IHL behavior, 
as measured by EPS, will differ between IHLs with different sources of 
revenue. It was demonstrated in Chapter III that the administrator of 
an institution that obtained a greater proportion of its total revenue 
from students would have an EPS-size frontier which lies inside that 
for an administrator of an IHL that gets a greater part of its revenue 
from non-students, ceteris paribus. Thus, the IHL that relies to a 
greater extent on students for revenue is expected to have lower EPS 
that an IHL of equal size which receives greater non-student revenue 
support. 
The hypothesis that revenue sources will affect IHL behavior, as 
measured by EPS, was tested by estimating an EPS function using cross-
sectional data on different classifications of IHLs. These data were 
obtained from the United States Departm~nt of Education. Four samples 
of IHL financial and enrollment data were drawn for IHLs classified 
by the NCES as doctoral, comprehensive, baccalaureate, and two-year 
institutions. Linear regression analysis was employed to estimate an 
EPS function for each of these four types of IHLs. 
Three of the four regression equations were significant. An F 
test for the significance of the equation estimated for the two-year 
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institutions indicated that the independent variables were collectively 
not significantly different from zero. The regression equations for 
doctoral, comprehensive, and baccalaureate institutions were significant 
at the .OS level. In each of the three significant regression equations, 
the hypothesis that revenue sources will affect IHL behavior could not 
be rejected as a significant positive relationship between non-student 
revenue as a proportion of total revenue and EPS was found. The results 
are consistent with the implication of the Prestige Maximization Model 
that a greater ratio of non-student revenues to total IHL revenues will 
be associated with greater expenditures per student. 
The results were consistent with previous studies (26, 6) of IHL 
costs as the estimated regression equations provided evidence that 
economies of size exist in the production of higher education at 
doctoral, comprehensive, and baccalaureate institutions. Slight 
diseconomies of size were found for comprehensive IHLs. The analysis 
contradicted previous theoretical and empirical work (Davies (12), 
Furubotn and Pejovich (14), Lee (20), Clarkson (9), Niskanen (28), 
Newhouse (27)) that has been done on the effects that different 
property rights arrangements have on firm behavior. A significant 
positive relationship between private ownership of an IHL and EPS was 
detected. 
Although the statistical results were consistent with the impli-
cations of the Prestige Maximization Model, there is reason to suspect 
that these results may have been biased due to the omission of a 
relevant explanatory variable. The model suggested that student 
quality would have an impact on EPS, but due to a lack of operational 
data the EPS functions were estimated without a student quality 
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variable. To the extent that this omitted variable was correlated with 
any of the other explanatory variables in the regression equation, the 
estimates of the regression coefficients on these variables were biased. 
The direction of this bias is unknown as the relationship between the 
omitted student quality variable and EPS is uncertain. 
The results suggested that either other relevant explanatory 
variables are missing from the model or that the relationships between 
the dependent and explanatory variables are not linear . 
2 
The low R s, 
• 27 and .32 for the equations estimated for comprehensive and 
baccalaureate IHLs respectively, indicated that the explanatory 
variables only explained about one-third of the variance of the 
dependent variable. The assumption of linear relationships between 
EPS and the independent variables could be incorrect, thus leaving a 
large proportion of the variance in EPS unaccounted for. 
There could be many other factors that were not included in the 
model that have an influence on IHL expenditures per student. 
Differences in technical efficiency between different IHLs that produce 
the same "quality" of service would allow the more efficient institu-
tion to operate with lower EPS. Since higher education is not a 
perfectly competitive industry, the lack of "do-or-die" competition can 
allow technically inefficient IHLs to survive. This, combined with 
the lack of knowledge about the most efficient method of producing 
education, implies the existence of different input mixes, and 
therefore different costs per student, at different IHLs. Measures 
of the qualitative aspects of IHL outputs and inputs are necessary 
before these sources of differences in EPS can be evaluated. Future 
improvements in the identification and measurement of higher education 
inputs and outputs will provide the information needed for better 
estimation of the sources of differences in IHL behavior. 
The Prestige Maximization Model developed and tested here provides 
theoretical support and empirical evidence suggesting that differences 
in sources of revenue play an important role in determining IHL 
behavior. As government policy can have a strong impact on the means 
of funding IHLs, policy can be used to alter IHL behavior with respect 
to per student resource expenditure. If it is determined that greater 
or fewer resources per student should be consumed in the higher educa-
tion industry, public policy can be devised to influence this resource 
use by controlling the availability and use of taxpayer dollars and the 
tax treatment of private gifts to IHLs. Greater EPS can be obtained 
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by increasing the taxpayer funding of colleges and universities and by 
liberalizing the tax treatment of private gifts to higher education. 
Lower EPS could be achieved by implimenting policies that require 
students and their families to pay a greater proportion of their college 
costs. Additional research is needed before the appropriate policy 
line can be ascertained. 
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